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REAL PROPERTY-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-RESULTING TRUST: Thomas v. Reid.

INTRODUCTION
The 1980 New Mexico Supreme Court case of Thomas v. Reid'
deals with the law of oral express, resulting, and constructive trusts
in land. The Thomas decision notifies practitioners that the court
continues to demand a high level of proof to impress a parol trust on
a deed used to convey land. 2 It reaffirms the application of resulting
and constructive trusts in characteristic fact patterns and expresses a
strong policy disposition toward upholding deeds of conveyance at
face value.
This Note, in order to explain the court's refusal to declare a trust
in Thomas v. Reid, examines sections seven and eight of New Mexico's Statute of Frauds,3 New Mexico's statutory remedy for a failed
oral trust in land,4 case law regarding trusts in land, and aspects of
the law of restitution. The theories, policies, and fact patterns associated with resulting and constructive trusts are discussed. New Mexico's statutory trust' is analyzed in relationship to these two common
law trusts. 6 Finally, this Note critiques the plaintiff's case in light of
the factual showing necessary to establish trusts inland by parol
evidence.
FACTS
In May, 1970, Clarence Reid transferred forty acres of unimproved farmland to his son and daughter-in-law, Johnny and Jackie
1. 94 N.M. 241,608 P.2d 1123 (1980).
2. In past cases the level of proof required has been described as "strong, cogent and convincing," Portales National Bank v. Beeman, 52 N.M. 243, 250, 196 P.2d 876, 880 (1948),
"clear and unequivocal," White v. Mayo, 35 N.M. 430, 440, 229 P. 1068, 1072 (1931), and
"clear and convincing," Wright v. Holloway, 37 N.M. 168, 171, 20 P.2d 274, 275 (1933).
3. The English Statute of Frauds was adopted in New Mexico in Childers v. Talbot, 4 N.M.
336, 339, 16 P. 275, 276 (1888), as part of the common law incorporated by the supreme court
in Browning v. Browning, 3 N.M. 659, 9 P. 677 (1886).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-2-13 (1978).
5. Id.
6. Section 46-2-13 has not been construed by the court. Although argued to be applicable in
Thomas v. Reid, the facts of that case did not necessitate a discussion by the court of New
Mexico's statutory trust. The lack of commentary in Thomas belies the importance that
§46-2-13 may have in future litigation involving oral trusts in land.
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Reid, and forty acres of improved farmland plus a town residential
lot to his wife, Bernice Reid. The property was conveyed by "absolute" warranty deeds, that is, instruments without language regarding trust or condition.
Clarence died intestate about two months after executing the
deeds. A year and a half later, in January of 1972, Bernice deeded
the portion of the farm which was in her name to Johnny and Jackie.
The son and daughter-in-law continued to farm the entire 80 acres
and, in 1973, leased out the mineral rights for exploratory purposes.
Bernice deeded the residential lot to Johnny in April of 1972 so
that a joint tenancy could be created by reconveyance to Bernice and
to Johnny's sister, Rose Ann Thomas. 7 At about the same time, Bernice also placed a savings account and certificates of deposit in joint
tenancy with her daughter, Rose Ann.8
In January of 1978, almost eight years after Clarence executed his
deeds, natural gas was discovered on the farm property." In August
of the same year, Rose Ann brought suit against Johnny and Jackie
in district court. Rose Ann claimed that the defendants held title to
the family farm in trust and that she was a beneficiary of the trust.
She did not claim that a written express trust existed; rather, she
claimed that Clarence's transfers of land in 1970 included oral agree7. Joint tenancy requires creation by the same conveyance, at the same time. J. Cribbett,
Principles of the Law of Property 101 (2d ed. 1975). Bernice Reid could not have created the
estate which she wished to share with Rose Ann Thomas except by conveyance to a third person, a "strawman," who could then reconvey jointly to mother and daughter. The deeds used
to create the joint tenancy appear at 25 and 26 in the Trial Record.
8. The property transferred in 1970 and 1972 was valued by defendants as follows:
$20,000
40A. unimproved farmland (minerals unsevered)
$35,000
40A. improved farmland (minerals unsevered)
T=$55,000
$15,000
residential property
$49,398
CDs and savings account
T = $64,398

(Trial Record at 21-34). Plaintiff did not introduce values of property at the time of conveyance; rather, she introduced present (1980) values of the mineral income. Trial Record at
66-67,155-56, 204-45.
The supreme court commented on the value of the transfers and the time for valuation as
follows: "The evidence does suggest that the father treated his children equally in that Rose
Ann received, as a joint tenant with her mother, title to the house in Loving and cash savings
which approximately equaled the value of the farm at the time of the father's death." 94 N.M.
at 242, 608 P.2d at 1124.
9. The case report speaks of 1971 as the date of discovery of the first gas well. The district
court's Findings of Fact Number 13 uses the date January, 1977 (Trial Record at 40). Appellants' Brief in Chief at 31 specifically refers to the mistake and claims 1978 as the proper year.
Appellee's Answer Brief at 7 also uses the 1978 date.
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ments that Johnny would hold legal title and share the beneficial
interest of some portion of the eighty-acre farm. ,0
HOLDINGS
The district court concluded that a trust existed. Legal title to the
entire estate was found to be in Johnny and Jackie Reid, with beneficial title to one half of the mineral estate in Rose Ann. As beneficiary, Rose Ann was awarded an accounting of one half of all income collected. In order to grant this judgment, the court concluded
that the property had been held by defendants on a constructive trust
and a resulting trust,II one or both based in a failed oral express
trust.' 2 The existence of these trusts was said to be based on "clear
and convincing evidence of constructive fraud" and "the clear intent
of the donor. . . to have both children . . . share in the property
and the income equally." ' 3
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court overturned the lower
court's finding of an express oral trust and held that the evidence
regarding intent and fraud was insufficient to allow the establishment of either a resulting or constructive trust.'" The decision
recognized Johnny and Jackie Reid as owners of the land and the unsevered mineral estate. Rose Ann's alleged interest in the property
was denied; her joint tenancy in the house and savings was
acknowledged.
BACKGROUND LAW
The lower court decision in Thomas v. Reid involved confusion of
the use of resulting and constructive trusts. The supreme court opinion is succinct and does not deal directly with each aspect of the
10. At the trial and appellate levels, plaintiff did not unequivocally state what property was
held in trust or for whom. The problem of indefiniteness of trust the res and parties is discussed
infra. See text accompanying notes 72-81 infra.
11. The court's conclusion is confusing. The resulting trust would not result in the award
given by the court to plaintiff. See note 61 infra. See also text accompanying notes 25-30,
57-60 infra.

12. The district court's Findings of Fact do not contain a separately numbered finding using
the term "oral express trust." Findings of Fact Numbers 7 and 8 combined express this conclusion (Trial Record at 39-40). Neverthless, the supreme court speaks of the district court's
"finding of an express oral trust." 94 N.M. at 242, 608 P.2d at 1124. Neither the resulting trust
nor the constructive trust is necessarily based on a failed oral express trust. See text accompanying note 27 infra and notes 38-40 infra.
13. District Court's Conclusions of Law, Numbers 2 and 3 (Trial Record at 41).
14. Not only was the evidence regarding intent "insufficient," it was not the type of intent
which supports the resulting trust. See notes 25 and 35 infra.
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lower court's reasoning. In assessing the reversal, therefore, it is
necessary to supply some of the elementary analysis assumed by the

supreme court.
The Statute of Frauds
The common law trusts and New Mexico's statutory remedy are
based on sections seven and eight of the Statute of Frauds.' 5 Section
seven reflects the statute's basic policy objective, protection against
false claims.' 6 It requires that "all declarations or creations of trust
• . .of any lands. . . shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust
. . . .,,,Section seven has been interpreted to refer only to the express creation of trust relationships by individuals.'" A writing is required to prove the existence of the trust when the settlor expressly
manifests his intention to separate the legal and equitable interest in
his property. The legal interest is transferred to the trustee, who is
responsible for the management of the property for the benefit of
the holder of the equitable estate, the beneficiary. ' A court, in
accord with section seven of the Statute of Frauds, may recognize
the express intention to separate title and impose a fiduciary duty
only when a "sufficient" writing is available to prove the existence

of the trust.2 0

Section eight, however, allows the court to dispense with the writing requirement when it is convinced of the veracity of a claim, even
though the statutorily required written evidence does not exist. Section eight creates an exception to the written evidence rule, providing
15. See note 3 supra.
16. The policy behind the Statute of Frauds is well expressed by Bogert as preventing "perjurers from manufacturing testimony and foisting express trusts on landowners who never
agreed to hold in trust, and in order to prevent similar efforts where there may have been a
misunderstanding of ambiguous or equivocal statements by the landowner." G. Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees § 497 at 466 (2d ed. rev. 1978). This statement of policy is particularly apropos to
Thomas v. Reid because plaintiff argued that defendant's statements that, "if the mineral lease
ever amounted to anything Plaintiff would get something out of it," were acknowledgements
of the existence of the trust. See Trial Record at 64-65, 128-29, 208-09 and Appellee's Answer
Brief at 1.
17. 1 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §40 at 309 (3d ed. 1967).
18. 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §406 (3d ed. 1967).
19. The separation of legal and equitable title is the sine qua non of the trust. A trust may be
of two types. (1)A "Declaration of Trust" in which the settlor declares himself to hold legal
title to presently held property in trust for the benefit of a beneficiary. Legal title remains in the
settlor; he divests himself of equitable title only. (2) A "transfer in trust" in which the settlor
transfers legal title to a trustee for the benefit of himself as beneficiary or for a third person as
beneficiary. That is, the transferor may be both settlor and beneficiary, divesting himself of
legal title only, or the transferor may convey both legal and equitable title. P. Haskell, Preface
to the Law of Trusts 7 (1975).
20. For discussion of the sufficiency of a writing, see I A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §§42,
46, 47 (3d ed. 1967).
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that "a trust [in land] shall or may arise or result by the implication
or construction of law."'" Section eight is invoked when policy considerations other than those associated with false claims are pre-

sented by the facts of the case before the court.22 Evidentiary standards are then adjusted to allow "implication" of a resulting trust or
"construction" of a constructive trust. Definitions and standards of
proof for these "implied" 2 3 trusts in land are well developed in New

Mexico case law.

4

New Mexico's statutory remedy for a failed oral

trust in land, however, has not yet been construed by New Mexico

courts.
The Common Law Resulting Trust
The resulting trust arises in limited fact patterns which have been
deemed, from feudal times, to exhibit a presumed intention on the
part of the transferor of property not to pass the beneficial interest."
21. Id., §40 at 309.
22. The methods used to circumvent the Statute of Frauds are well described by Scott:
The result is that the courts have evolved certain forms of expression which
can be called into use to reach whatever result they feel ought to be reached, that
result depending upon considerations of policy which are frequently left unexpressed. Whenever they are desirous of giving relief in spite of the statute, they
emphasize the hardship which would result from the application of the statute;
they denounce the party who relies upon the statute; they speak of fraud and say
that the statute was enacted to prevent fraud and not to promote fraud. On the
other hand, if it is felt that the transaction should not be upheld in spite of the
resulting hardship, it is easy for them to place the responsibility upon the
legislature and to refuse to "fly in the teeth of the statute."
Id. at 311. Bogert comments, perhaps less cynically, that § 8 shows:
that the legislatures did not intend to go as far as to provide that all relief on real
property trust theories should be dependent on the existence of written evidence
... .They realized that [the remedies allowed by §8] for correcting injustice
were so fundamental that they must be employed, even at the risk of mistake and
perjury ...
G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §497 at 466-67 (2d ed. rev. 1978).
23. Because resulting and constructive trusts are both judicially imposed they are often
grouped together as "implied," in contrast to "express" trusts. The two common law trusts,
as commonly used however, have different theoretical bases; it does not make sense to place
them together under one label. See text accompanying notes 25-45 infra. "Intent enforcing"
has been suggested as an appropriate label for resulting trusts with constructive trusts coming
under an entirely different label, "fraud rectifying." G. Bogert, Law of Trusts §71 at 262 (5th
ed. 1973). It may be that at least one form of the resulting trust, the Purchase Money Resulting
Trust, is also "fraud rectifying." See text accompanying notes 31-36 infra.
24. The New Mexico Digest reports at least 37 cases dealing with the use of these trusts. See,
e.g., cases cited in notes 31, 35, 38, 40, 43, 45 infra.
25. Scott expresses this "negative intention" in his passage distinguishing the express from
the resulting trust:
[A]n express trust is created if it appears that there was an affirmative intention
to create it; whereas in the case of the resulting trust the circumstances indicate
the absence of an intention to give the beneficial interest to the person in whom
legal title to the property is vested.
5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 404.1 at 3213 (3d ed. 1967).
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The implication is made from the actions of the parties and other
cumstances of the transfer that the settlor intended to retain
beneficial interest. Under particular facts the settlor becomes
beneficiary, even if such identity was not expressly intended by
transferor
of the land.
26
Scott

cirthe
the
the

states that there are only three situations in which

the trust which arises is properly called a resulting trust: (1)
where an express trust fails in whole or in part; (2) where an express trust is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate;
(3) where property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by
one person and at his direction the vendor conveys the property
to another person.27
Scott's first two examples are best understood a equitable reversions.28 Where a trust fails, for example, because a beneficiary is not
named or because the trust purpose is too indefinite to be carried
out, and, no provision is made in the trust agreement for such a contingency, a court can safely infer that the settlor would intend a
reversion of the trust property to himself or herself.29 The same may
be said of the situation where an express trust "fails" because it is
fully performed and a surplus of property remains."
Scott's third example, the Purchase Money Resulting Trust, is best
understood from an historical perspective. 3' The implication that a
26. Austin W. Scott, frequently cited in this Note, is the author of a six-volume treatise on
the law of trusts which is considered the authority in the field. Scott is also the reporter for the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959).
27. 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §404.1 at 3214.
28. An "equitable reversion" is a future interest held by the grantor or his heirs. T. Bergin
and P. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 62-64 (1966).
29. An express trust may also fail because a named beneficiary is not ascertainable, because
the beneficiary of a testamentary trust predeceases the testator or is incapable of taking,
because the beneficiary renounces the trust, the trust purpose is illegal, or the trust violates the
Rule Against Perpetuities. 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §§ 411, 411.1 (3d ed. 1967).
30. Under these two fact patterns a court has three choices: (1) to allow the trustee to have
both legal and equitable title to the property; (2) to pass legal as well as equitable title to the
beneficiary; or (3) to return legal title to the settlor. In both fact patterns it is self-evident that
the trustee is not intended to have full interest. Under fact pattern (1) it may be impossible to
pass title to the beneficiary. Under fact pattern (2) it may be considered inequitable to give the
beneficiaries more than the settlor intended them to have. Through the years, courts have exercsed the third choice, rationalizing that the settlor held the equitable interest all along.
The trust relationship is used as a vehicle to achieve a just and logical solution to the problem. No writing is necessary to prevent fraud in these two fact patterns. The settlor who did not
give clear directions or did not provide for a particular contingency "must have" intended to
reserve the beneficial interest. Or, as Scott states, it is "what [the settlor] probably would have
intended if the question had occurred to his mind." 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §404.1 at
3214 (3d ed. 1967).
31. The Purchase Money Resulting Trust is not an equitable reversion following an express
trust, as are Scott's first two examples. It is grouped conceptually with the other two examples
because the Purchase Money Resulting Trust shares the characteristic occurrence of one per-
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person must have intended to retain beneficial interest when he or
she provided consideration for land and caused title to vest in
another, was imminently reasonable to the medieval mind. 2 The
feudal assumption was that a gratuitous conveyance must be "upon
a use." 3 3 The Purchase Money Resulting Trust persists as a remnant
of the medieval supposition that a trust was implied in a gratuitous
conveyance of land. 4 Modern law otherwise regards such a conveyance as a gift.
The resulting trust in all three of the fact patterns discussed by
Scott is said to arise upon the presumed intention of the parties.3" It
son's causing legal title to vest in another while he intends to keep the beneficial estate as his
own. P. Haskell, Preface to the Law of Trusts 144 (1975).
A New Mexico case illustrating the Purchase Money Resulting Trust is Browne v. Sieg, 55
N.M. 447, 234 P.2d 1045 (1951). Browne involved an action by a mother against her son's administratrix. The mother recovered property for which she had provided the purchase money
and for which her son had taken title in his name. The evidence showed that the mother had
been ill and unable to attend to the transaction and that the property had always been referred
to as "grandma's" or "mom's lot."
32. G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §454 at 625-26 (2d ed. rev. 1977).
33. The feudal "use" was the ancestor of the modern trust. For discussion of the early
"resulting use," see 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §404-05 (3d ed. 1967). See also I A. Scott,
The Law of Trusts §4.4 (3d ed. 1967).
34. It is as if the modern mind, like that of the 14th or 15th century, cannot quite believe
that anyone would provide the purchase price for so important an item as land without meaning to keep the "use" of that land for himself. The presumption of a trust can be overcome,
but the burden of so doing is placed on the transferee who received the land without providing
the purchase price. If the transferee is closely related to the person who provided the purchase
price the burden of proof changes. Such a transferee is presumptively the recipient of a gift. A
child, for instance, may be given land by a parent who has instructed the transferor to transfer
to the child, with money forthcoming from the parent. 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §§442,
443 (3d ed. 1967). Our social, and therefore judicial, understanding breaks down if the
transferee is a business associate or distant relative or a stranger. A gift is only socially appropriate in some situations, and the law follows custom. When our sense of the appropriateness
of a gift is offended, the Purchase Money Resulting Trust is imposed, the fund provider being,
simultaneously, settlor and beneficiary. This is the case in spite of the fact that the actual
vendee who provided the money had no express intention to be either a settlor or a beneficiary.
35. In Thomas v. Reid, the supreme court used the 1960 New Mexico case, McCord v.
Ashbaugh, 67 N.M. 61, 352 P.2d 641 (1960), to illustrate the appropriate use of the resulting
trust, i.e., effecting the settlor's presumed intention. In that case, defendant owners of land
conveyed title to their predecessors in interest without consideration. The transfer was effected
in order to satisfy Forest Service requirements relative to the transfer of grazing permits. Plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the original owners, attempted to levy on the land during the twelve
days between transfer from defendants to prior owners and the second conveyance to defendants. The court stated:
[W]e conclude that during whatever brief period title may have stood in the name
of [the previous owners) by virtue of the conveyance, . . . they only had bare
legal title to the property in question as trustees for the [owner) . . . . [The]
judgment debtors. . . had no interest in the property to which the judgment lien
could attach.
67 N.M. at 66, 352 P.2d at 644.
The intention of the transferors (owners) to reserve beneficial title was implied by the court
from the short length of time for which they conveyed away legal title and from proof that
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also seems to prevent the unjust enrichment of the trustee of the
failed express trust and the "proxy" vendee in the Purchase Money
Resulting Trust situation.3" Restitution to prevent unjust enrich-

ment, however, was not a concept used in fourteenth or fifteenth
century legal thought." We have inherited the feudal rationale for
the use of the resulting trust in these fact patterns as "the law."
Under modern theory the resulting trust may as easily be understood
as a restitutional device, used by a court in limited fact patterns, as it
may be understood as an implication of intention from the facts.
The Constructive Trust
The constructive trust, on the other hand, is a remedial device
used by a court in widely divergent fact patterns." It is based on the
prevention of unjust enrichment with little or no consideration given
to the intention of the settlor.11 Furthermore, there is not necessartheir sole intent in conveying was to correct the deed to meet Forest Service standards. Legal
title was found to "result back" to the holders of the beneficial title. The state of affairs prior
to the conveyance of legal title, therefore, controlled the judgment creditor's rights.
36. The actual vendee is the person who provided the consideration. The person given legal
title, the trustee, was not meant to be the real owner and is thus a "proxy" vendee.
37. Furthermore, the theory upon which the resulting trust was based was of no practical
concern because section eight of the English Statute of Frauds allowed relaxation of the written
evidence requirement on either "implication" or "construction of law." It did not demand
that the implied trusts be based only on the intention of the parties. 5 A. Scott, The Law of
Trusts §404 at 3212-13 (3d ed. 1967).
38. The constructive trust has been employed by the New Mexico Supreme Court in a variety of situations, some of which seem more appropriate for application of the resulting trust.
In cases where agents purchased land in their own names rather than for their principles, for
example, the court has used the constructive trust. O'Neill v. Otero, 15 N.M. 707, 113 P. 614
(1910); Rice v. First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque, 50 N.M 99, 171 P.2d 318 (1946); Mitchell v.
Allison, 54 N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231 (1949); Harris v. Dunn, 55 N.M. 434, 234 P.2d 821 (1951).
Perhaps it is simply a matter of the judicial popularity of the theory of restitution which leads
the court to so readily employ the remedy of constructive trust.
The constructive trust has also been used to retrieve profits where an agent wrongfully used
the principle's property to his own gain, Iriart v. Johnson, 75 N.M. 745, 411 P.2d 226 (1965);
where possession of two tracts of land had been exchanged without exchange of deeds, and the
heirs of one of the owners requested a declaration of interests in the parcels, Frietze v. Frietze,
78 N.M. 676, 437 P.2d 137 (1968); and to redistribute property where a son obtained title to his
father's real estate to the exclusion of his siblings, through clearly proven undue influence.
Walters v. Walters, 26 N.M. 22, 188 P. 1105 (1920).
For more examples of the New Mexico Supreme Court's use of the constructive trust, see
also Loveridge v. Loveridge, 52 N.M. 353, 198 P.2d 444 (1948); Griffith v. Tierney, 34 N.M.
387, 281 P. 461 (1929); Flanagan v. Benvie, 58 N.M. 525, 273 P.2d 381 (1954); Velasquez v.
Mascarenas, 71 N.M. 133, 376 P.2d 311 (1962).
39. Judge Cardozo expressed the flexibility of the constructive trust by describing the
remedy as "the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression." 5 A. Scott,
The Law of Trusts §462 at 3413 (3d ed. 1967). Bogert describes the constructive trust as "a
court-created trust . . . a mere piece of remedial machinery, similar to an execution or an injunction." Later, in the same section he refers to the constructive trust as the court's "most
convenient method of working out justice and preventing one party from unfairly enriching
himself." G. Bogert, Law of Trusts §71 at 262-63 (5th ed. 1973).
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ily, as in the resulting trust, an identity of settlor and beneficiary.
The constructive trust may be used to convey land to whomever is
deemed by the court to have been unjustly deprived of the land."'
The unjustly deprived person is labeled the "constructive
beneficiary." The land is conveyed to the constructive beneficiary
via an equitable in personam order given to the "constructive
trustee.""' The recipient of the order to convey is an actual trustee
only if he or she is already in a fiduciary relationship to the
beneficiary. If the constructive trust device is used to remedy a situation of unjust enrichment where there is no underlying fiduciary
relationship, the "trustee" performs the role in name only. The
court cannot impose the status of a trustee on the person; the remeas trustee so as to impose a
dial device simply labels the 4individual
2
sole duty, the duty to convey.
In New Mexico cases the restitutionary base of the constructive
trust is acknowledged by a requirement of a showing of "fraud
either actual or constructive" as an essential element for application
of the "trust."4 " What the court is looking for is not necessarily

40. In Thomas v. Reid, plaintiff's arguments for a constructive trust were based on the existence of an oral express trust. See text accompanying notes 61-66 infra. It should be noted that
imposition of a constructive trust of land does not depend upon proof of an oral trust. Unjust
enrichment due to "fraud at the inception," independent of an oral express trust, supported a
constructive trust in the New Mexico case of Velasquez v. Mascarenas, 71 N.M. 133, 376 P.2d
311 (1962). In Velasquez, defendant acquired title from the state on the basis of a false statement of a material fact. In Walters v. Walters, 26 N.M. 22, 188 P. 1105 (1920), the bases for
imposition of a constructive trust on absolute deeds, used to transfer land from father to son,
were confidential relationship and undue influence. The son in Walters promised to provide for
his brothers and sisters, the plaintiffs, but there was no evidence of a promise to the father, at
the time of transfer, that the son would hold in trust, and, no evidence that the father intended
to separate the legal and equitable interests in his property.
41. Bogert defines the constructive trust as "a device used by chancery to compel one who
unfairly holds a property interest to convey that interest to another to whom it justly belongs."
G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §471 at 3 (2d ed. rev. 1978).
42. See, D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies §4.3 (1973) which contrasts and
compares the constructive trust and the quasi-contract. The remedies are procedurally different; the constructive trust being an equitable remedy, the implied-in-law contract arising at
law. They are substantively alike. Both are based in restitution and both impose "quasi" relationships. The party obligated by the implied-in-law contract is not transformed by the court
into a contractor; the trustee of the constructive trust is not made into a real fiduciary. The
facts do not allow implication of an actual relationship of contract or trust. They do, however,
allow a rule of law to be applied so as to establish rights and liabilities similar to those of contracting parties or parties in an express trust relationship.
43. N.M. Potash & Chemical Co. v. Independent Potash & Chemical Co., 115 F.2d 544
(10th Cir. 1940); Boardman v. Kendrick, 59 N.M. 167, 280 P.2d 1053 (1955). The restitutionary base is explicitly recognized by language regarding unjust enrichment in, e.g., Yucca
Mining & Petroleum Company, Inc. v. Howard C. Phillips Oil Co., 69 N.M. 281, 365 P.2d 925
(1961); Hugh K. Gale Post No. 2182, Veterans of Foreign Wars of Farmington v. Norris, 63
N.M. 312, 318 P.2d 609 (1957).
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fraud per se," but a fact pattern in which it would be unjust to leave
the situation as it is. 5 The fraud formula simply gives the court a
label for the wrongdoing which it wishes to remedy in order to prevent unjust enrichment and achieve fairness through restitution.
New Mexico's Statutory Trust
The law of restitution is seen in New Mexico in both the statutory
implied trust,"6 and in the common law trusts. 7 The statute appears
to be a codified resulting trust. It forces a reconveyance to the settlor
when land is conveyed on an oral trust with either the settlor or a
third party as beneficiary. 8 If the intended trustee refuses to carry
out the trust, and claims a Statute of Frauds defense, §46-2-13 will
44. "Actual fraud consists indeceit, artifice, trick, design, some direct and active operation
of the mind. . . . It is something said, done, or omitted by a person with the design of
perpetrating what he knows to be a cheat or deception." Black's Law Dictionary 595 (5th ed.
1979).
45. An example of a land case in which the constructive trust has been denied perhaps best
illustrates the unjust enrichment-restitution basis for the application of the remedy. In Trujillo
v. Trujillo, 75 N.M. 724, 410 P.2d 947 (1966), the court denied relief to a mother seeking
reconveyance of a farm which had been deeded to her son six years earlier by both parents. The
court found no undue influence or fraud on the part of the son who had worked and managed
the farm both before and after his parents moved to another state. There was no proof of an
oral promise by the son to reconvey the property, and the parents' request to reconvey was
made two or three months after the tme of transfer. The court could find no reason to deny the
validity of the quitclaim deed used by the mother and father to transfer the land, despite the
lack of monetary consideration given by the son.
46. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-2-13 provides:
A. When an interest in realproperty is conveyed by deed to a person on a trust
which isunenforceable on account of the statute of frauds and the intended
trustee or his successor in interest still holds title but refuses to carry out the trust
on account of the statute offrauds, the intended trustee or his successor in interest,
except to the extent that the successor in interest is a bona fide purchaser of a
legal interest in the real property in question, shall be under a duty to convey the
interestin realproperty to the settlor or his successorin interest. A court having
jurisdiction may prescribe the conditions upon which the interest shall be conveyed to the settlor or his successor in interest.
B. Where the intended trustee has transferred part or all of his interest and it
has come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, the intended trustee shall be
liable to the settlor or his successor in interest for the value of the interest thus
transferred at the time of its transfer, less such offsets as the court may deem
equitable.
(Emphasis added). Section 46-2-13 is § 16 of the Uniform Trusts Act (1937). The text of the Act
is reprinted in G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §7 at 25-30 (2d ed. 1965).
47. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-2-13 reads "conveyed by deed to a person on a trust." The
beneficiary is not denominated. The implication is that the statute refers to either form of
trust, one with the settlor as beneficiary or one with a third person as beneficiary. The statute
differs in this regard from the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) and the Restatement of
Restitution (1937). The Restatement of Trusts treats oral trusts of land in favor of the settlor in
§44 and oral trusts in favor of a third person in §45. The Restatement of Restitution has secdons which parallel the Restatement of Trusts, §§ 182 and 183.
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not allow him to use the Statute of Frauds to perpetrate the fraud.
Rather, §46-2-13 dictates that the trustee "shall 4be9 under a duty to
convey the interest in real property to the settlor."

The statute accomplishes a "resulting back" of the land identical
to what the common law resulting trust would achieve. The fact pattern to which §46-2-13 is addressed is, however, not a fact pattern in
which the resulting trust has historically been used. An oral agreement not complied with is simply not a fact pattern which lends itself
to allow the clear implication of a settlor's intention not to convey
the beneficial interest.5" In addition, the existence of the oral trust
shows an express intention to convey the beneficial interest separately from the legal interest. The would-be settlor under this fact pattern is attempting exactly what the Statute of Frauds forbids,
conveyance of legal title to land upon an oral trust, whether in his
favor or to the benefit of another.
The fact pattern, though not historically appropriate for the
resulting trust, presents a clear injustice. The trustee should not be
allowed to use the oral nature of the trust to allow unjust selfenrichment. Despite the injustice, most American courts allow the
intended trustee to keep the whole interest in the land.' I To do otherwise is considered an assault on the Statute of Frauds. The statute is
said to prevent proof of the oral trust for any reason, including the
prevention of unjust enrichment. 52
The New Mexico statute is, therefore, a departure from majority
case law. It allows proof of the oral trust of land to prevent unjust
enrichment and places the trustee under a "duty," with language
suggestive of the constructive trust. The effect may be seen as identical to enforcement of the statutorily forbidden oral trust but the
rationalization seems to be restitution, not express or implied intention.53
49.
50.
51.
52.

N.M. Stat. Ann §46-2-13 (1978).
See text accompanying notes 25-34 supra.
G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §495 at 432-7 (2d ed. rev. 1978).
Scott points out the fallacy of this reasoning:
It is clear, however, that the policy of the Statute of Frauds does not prevent
showing an oral trust . . . for all purposes . . . . [W]here a transfer of land

upon an oral trust . . . is procured by fraud, duress, or undue influence, the
courts have had no difficulty in imposing a constructive trust, even though in
order to prove that the transferee was guilty of a wrong in obtaining the land it is
necessary to prove the oral trust. . . . If it is possible to show an oral trust under
these circumstances, it would seem that the policy of the Statute of Frauds
should not forbid showing the oral trust for the purpose of establishing an unjust
enrichment.
I A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §44 at 332 (3d ed. 1967).
53. The effect is the same only if the oral trust was in favor of the transferor. If the trust was
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Whatever the theoretical base of New Mexico's statutory trust in
land-intention or unjust enrichment-the effect of the statute in all
cases is a return to status quo ante. A compromise is struck between
the protection afforded by the Statute of Fraud's protection against
false claims and the policy of preventing unjust enrichment.5" If
§46-2-13 creates a resulting trust, it is not the classic resulting trust,
but merely a situation which has the same legal effect, a resulting
back to the transferor. If §46-2-13 creates a constructive trust, it is a
restitutionary device which must be used to convey land in a
prescribed direction, to the settlor.
It is not clear how much of a restriction §46-2-13 places on
judicial use of the common law constructive trust based on an oral
express trust. The common law trust can be used in land cases to
achieve restitution for a beneficiary other than the settlor. 5 It
appears from the wording of §46-2-13,56 however, that the statute
provides an exclusive remedy. It seems that whenever a trustee
refuses to perform an oral trust in land and successfully raises the
Statute of Frauds as his defense, New Mexico courts must return the
parties to status quo ante. A court probably cannot force a conveyance to a third party beneficiary by use of the common law constructive trust without evading §46-2-13.
ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE
The complaint in Thomas v. Reid stated that defendants held
property in trust but did not designate the type of trust. On appeal,
the plaintiff, Rose Ann Thomas, argued for application of all three
implied trusts available in New Mexico: the resulting trust; the constructive trust; and N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-2-13. Plaintiff's arguments
seem to have been made without comprehension of the legal effects
or theoretical bases of either of the two common law trusts or of the
statutory trust.
Plaintiff argued for application of the resulting trust on the basis
of consideration supplied in the form of "the love and affection
in favor of a third person, the statute makes the settlor, not the third person, the beneficiary.
In the first instance, the land is returned to the settlor-beneficiary in his role as would-be settlor, not in his role as beneficiary of an express trust. In the second case, the land is returned to
the settlor; it is not transferred to the third person beneficiary of the attempted express trust.
54. The return of the parties to the situation which existed before the transfer does not carry
the risk of mistake associated with enforcement of the oral trust. When there is insufficient
evidence to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, but there is sufficient evidence of unjust enrichment
arising from the wrongful act of the intended trustee of an oral trust, the court may lawfully be
able to act in only the statutorily prescribed fashion.
55. See I A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §45 (3d ed. 1967).
56. See note 46 supra.
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which the Plaintiff, and for that matter the Defendant, showed for
their father .

.

.

."I

According to the plaintiff, the resulting trust

would allow beneficial and legal title to be held by both Johnny and
Rose Ann as providers of consideration. Rose Ann thus likened the
requested resulting trust to the classic Purchase Money Resulting
Trust. 58 She argued that the resulting trust "follows or goes with the
real consideration,"" and thus does not result in returning legal title
to Clarence, the settlor. Such a result is theoretically unsound. In the
Purchase Money Resulting Trust, the person who provides consideration is, simultaneously, the settlor and the beneficiary. Title
"results back" to the creator of the trust, the person who is presumed by virtue of his act of supplying money to have intended himself to be the beneficiary. 6" This identity of settlor and beneficiary
was lacking in plaintiff's explanation of the parties to the requested
resulting trust.
There were also flaws in plaintiff's argument claiming a constructive trust. She argued, not on a general theory of unjust enrichment,
but from section forty-five of the Restatement of Trusts, which deals
with the transfer of land on an oral trust for the benefit of a third
person. 6 ' Section forty-five demands threshold proof of a transfer
"intrust [without a] memorandum properly evidencing the intention
57. Appellee's Answer Brief at 21.
58. Plaintiff also argued for a resulting trust based on a failed express trust. Appellee's
Answer Brief at 20. Plaintiff inappropriately used Scott's discussion of appropriate fact patterns for use of the resulting trust. Scott does say that a resulting trust rises on a failed express
trust, but not an oral trust which fails for lack of a writing. See text accompanying notes 29-30
and note 29supra for discussion of "failure" of a trust as the term is used by Scott.
59. Appellee's Answer Brief at 21, quoting 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1031 at 62.
Plaintiff inappropriately used Pomeroy as authority for her position that the trust should be to
the benefit of herself and her brother. In § 1031 at 63 Pomeroy states that in situations corresponding to Scott's fact patterns (1) and (2), see text accompanying note 27 supra: "If the
conveyance be by a deed, the trust will result to the grantor .... ." See note 60 infra. In the
Purchase Money Resulting Trust fact pattern Pomeroy states that a "trust at once results in
1 § 1037 at 71. Plaintiff did not keep the Purchase
favor of the party who pays the price ....
Money Resulting Trust pattern differentiated from the resulting trust based on a "failed" oral
express trust. See note 58 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 31-34 and note 34 supra, for discussion of the theory of the
Purchase Money Resulting Trust. If the supreme court had allowed a resulting back of the
property to Clarence Reid's estate, the outcome would not have been a one-half interest for
Rose Ann. Because Clarence died intestate, the property would have passed at least partially to
Bernice Reid. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-102 (1978). If the farm were Clarence's separate
property, it would be divided one-fourth to Bernice, three-fourths to the children (threeeighths to Johnny and three-eighths to Rose Ann). N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-102(A). If the farm
were community property, it would all pass to Bernice. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-102(B). The
district court found that the property was Clarence's separate property. The supreme court did
not review the finding. The evidence was contradictory. Trial Record at 32, 152-53, 198-99.
61. Appellee's Answer Brief at 13. See note 40 supra.
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to create a trust ' 62 and facts showing actual fraud in the inception,
abuse of a confidential relationship, or transfer of land in contemplation of death. 3
Rose Ann argued "fraud . . . inferred by the court as a constructive fraud,""' based on a confidential relationship between her
father and her brother and the transfer of land by Clarence for the
purpose of avoiding probate.6 5 Attempts to prove the confidential
relationship and the transfer in contemplation of death were, however, superfluous without initial proof of the failed oral express trust
required by section forty-five. To prove the express trust in accordance with standard definitions, plaintiff would have had to show:
(1) the intent of Clarence to create the trust; (2) the clear identification of the trust property by
Clarence; and (3) a certain identification
66
of the parties to the trust.
None of the testimony produced by plaintiff showed an intent on
the part of Clarence Reid to separate legal and equitable title to the
farmland. Plaintiff introduced generalized testimony regarding her
father's equal treatment of herself and her brother, 67 Clarence's personality characteristic of fairness, 6s and the Reid family's
"closeness. "69 Rose Ann introduced statements by Clarence Reid
62. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 (1959).
63. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 at 118 (1959) provides:
§ 45. Effect of Failureof Oral Trustfor a Third Person
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos to
another in trust for a third person, but no memorandum properly
evidencing the intention to create a trust is signed, as required by
the Statute of Frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the
trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a constructive trust for
the third person, if, but only if,
(a) the transferee by fraud, duress or undue influence prevented
the transferor from creating an enforceable interest in the
third person, or
(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential
relation to the transferor, or
(c) the transfer was made by the transferor in anticipation of
death.
(2) Except under the circumstances stated in Subsection (1, a, b, c),
where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos to
another in trust for a third prson, and the transferor's intention to
create a trust but not the identity of the beneficiary is properly
manifested, and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the
transferee holds the interest upon a resulting trust for the
transferor.
64. Appellee's Answer Brief at 17, citing to Trial Record at 170.
65. Appellee's Answer Brief at 13, 14.
66. See G. Bogert, Law of Trusts §§ 1,8, 11(5th ed. 1973).
67. Trial Record at 72-73, 89, 93.
68. Id. at 77.
69. Id. at 67, 70.
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showing his wish that both Johnny and Rose Ann care for their
mother. 0 She also offered the testimony of an attorney who had
been consulted by the father regarding the preparation of a will
devising the farm in equal shares to Rose Ann and Johnny."' There
was, however, no evidence showing discussion of a trust or promises
made by Johnny at the time of conveyance that he would hold the
farm for the benefit of anyone.
Plaintiff also never unequivocally identified the property upon
which she wished to have a trust imposed. The complaint first
described Rose Ann as the "equitable owner of an undivided onehalf interest" in the farm, without mention of the mineral deposits.72
Yet, the prayer in the complaint was for a declaratory judgment that
"Plaintiff and Defendant each own an undivided one-half interest in
and to the minerals under the . . . property," without reference to
the surface rights."'
The tenuousness of Rose Ann's identification of the trust property
was highlighted by testimony showing that little mineral development was going on in the area in 1970 when Clarence Reid made the
conveyances of property."' Johnny Reid leased the property for exploration in 1973, and gas was discovered in 1978. It is unreasonable
to contend that Clarence Reid could have intended to place in trust
mineral deposits which he did not know existed." Though it is true
that he could have placed the mineral rights in trust without knowing
of their future value, the deeds that he used were the only written
evidence available and they showed no intention to sever, nor actual
severance, of mineral rights from surface rights. 7"
Another vulnerability in plaintiff's claim for a constructive trust
based on a failed oral express trust was her uncertain identification
of the parties. She was not sure who the beneficiaries of the trust
were. Besides herself, Rose Ann named Johnny, Bernice, and Jackie
70. Id. at 79.
71. Id. at 118-20.
72. Complaint, 2, Trial Record at I.
73. Complaint, Prayers, number 1, Trial Record at 2-3. In Plaintiff's Answer Brief the
discrepancy was explained by a waiver theory. Rose Ann claimed that both surface and
minerals made up the trust property but, as she was not a farmer, she waived her rights to the
surface. Appellee's Answer Brief at 26.
74. Trial Record at 158-59. The appeal record also included an affidavit of an independent
landman familiar with the mineral development in the area of the Reid farm. This affidavit was
not received into evidence by the trial court. The affidavit with attached maps showed virtually
no mineral development in the area in 1970-72. Trial Record at 29.
75. As the supreme court states: "It is speculative to suggest he intended to divide something
of which he had no knowledge." 94 N.M. at 242, 608 P.2d at 1124.
76. Trial Record at 4, 24.
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as possible beneficiaries.7 7 Her arguments also showed confusion as
to the identify of possible trustees. Rose Ann petitioned the district
court for a declaratory judgment naming Johnny Reid and his wife,
Jackie, as trustees. Throughout the trial record and the plaintiff's
appellate brief, however, discussion proceeded as if Johnny were the
only trustee.7
Further, the role of the mother as a possible trustee or settlor, as
well as a possible beneficiary, was never plausibly explained. The
father deeded one-half of the farm to the mother in 1970 at the same
time that he conveyed the other half to his son and daughter-in-law.
Forty acres of the farm thus became the mother's separate property.
Plaintiff claimed:
[T]he oral trust was attempted to be created on May 19, 1970
• . . with the full knowledge and agreement and consent of the
Defendant and the parties' mother. . . . [E]ither a constructive
or a resulting trust arose at that instant . . . . Therefore, Bernice I. Reid simply passed legal title through herself to the
Defendant, Johnny Reid, and could pass no better title than she
had, which title had a trust impressed upon it at the same time.
Therefore, that particularconveyance [from mother to son] was
superfluous and means nothing more to this case than if the entire eighty acres had been deeded to the Defendant initially on
May 19, 1970 . . . . [The Defendant was the intended trustee
of the property and the deceased. . . simply made Bernice L
Reid, his wife, a strawman in the course of events of getting the
legal title into the son. .. .
Bernice Reid denied that the conveyance was made to her in trust
and denied that she made the conveyance to Johnny in trust. She
consistently claimed, rather, that the understanding among family
members was that Johnny was to have the farm because he was a
farmer, and Rose Ann was to have the town property and the family
savings."0 Furthermore, Rose Ann herself stated that no promises
were made other than that the two children would take care of their
mother." It is difficult, therefore, to see how Clarence could have
used Bernice as a "strawman," the holder of legal title only, in the
process of passing title to the entire farm to Johnny.
77. Id. at 98.
78. See, e.g., Trial Record at 124. Little attention was given to Jackie Reid as co-holder of
legal title to the property. Appellee's Answer Brief at 28. See also Appellant's Brief in Chief at
31-32 and Appellant's Reply Brief at 11.
79. Appellee's Answer Brief at 24 (emphasis added).
80. Trial Record at 21-22, 152-53, 159-60.
81. Id.at 130.
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Plaintiff's lack of proof of the elements of an express trust
precluded use of New Mexico's statutory remedy as well as use of the
constructive trust. Section 46-2-13 requires proof of transfer of land
by deed "on a trust" as a condition precedent to its application.82
Thus, plaintiff's argument for the creation of a trust by statute suffered from the same initial flaw as her argument for the common law
constructive trust, taken from section forty-five of the Restatement
of Trusts.
Furthermore, the statutory remedy, like the resulting trust, would
not have given plaintiff what she requested, a one-half interest in the
mineral estate of the family farm. Instead, had the failed oral express trust in land been shown to exist and §46-2-13 been employed,
the result would have been a conveyance to the estate of Clarence
Reid.83
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND THE
COURTS' HOLDINGS IN
THOMAS v. REID
Inherent in the district and supreme courts' assessments of the
evidence in Thomas v. Reid was consideration of the policies to be
served by alternate holdings. The lower court was willing to dismiss
Statute of Frauds concerns and focus on what the court saw as the
implied intention of Clarence Reid and the unjust enrichment of
out the imJohnny Reid. The district court's concern was to carry
84
puted desire of the father to treat his children equally.
The supreme court was not convinced that concern for upholding
intention or preventing unjust enrichment should control the outcome of the case. The court was convinced, rather, that:
It would create havoc in the law for this Court to allow the
redistribution of assets conveyed by a parent to his children
without stronger evidence that the parent desired perpetual
equality between his children. Obviously the father attempted to
divide his property as best he could with his understanding of the
circumstances as they existed at the time. He could have pursued
many other options but he did not. We cannot by legal fiat vest
the father with a vision of the future made available to the present court by virtue of hindsight.8"
82. See text accompanying notes 46-50 and note 46 supra.
83. See note 60 supra.
84. "But, the Court in this case is going to find that-and, there seems to be very little quesdon in my mind about this that Mr. Reid, at the time of his death . . . wanted to treat his
children equally. I think the evidence is overwhelming as to that." Trial Record at 168-69.
85. 94 N.M. at 242,608 P.2d at 1124.
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The manner in which Clarence Reid conveyed his property in 1970
and his lack of knowledge of the existence of the mineral wealth at
that time were determinative factors, therefore, in the decision
reached by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Statute of Frauds concerns are evident in the court's reasoning. It
is true that the fear of false claims associated with oral evidence is
not specifically expressed. But the "havoc in the law" dissuasive of a
holding in favor of a trust encompasses the risk of mistake as well as
such concerns as predictability in land transfers and the upholding
of face value validity of documents of conveyance.
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court proceeded with appropriate restraint in Thomas v. Reid. Caution is needed when creating an oral
trust on deeds used to convey land, especially when the alleged settlor is not before the court and has not left written evidence of intention.8 6 Thomas v. Reid makes it clear that in New Mexico the court
will not easily be drawn away from Statute of Frauds policy considerations. Implication of a resulting trust, construction of an
equitable remedy, and application of New Mexico's statutory trust
require high levels of factual proof. Furthermore, the court must be
shown that the facts presented are consistent with the theoretical
bases of resulting and constructive trust and with the elements of
N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-2-13.
Assuming a factual presentation stronger than that in Thomas v.
Reid, one which induces the court to make a policy shift away from
the Statute of Frauds, a question remains as to choice of remedy.
There has been no case law stating whether New Mexico's statutory
trust is an exclusive remedy. Plaintiff in Thomas v. Reid argued for
use of the common law constructive trust in favor of an alleged third
beneficiary. Even if the facts claimed by the plaintiff to exist-an
unenforceable oral trust which the trustee refuses to perform, abuse
of confidential relationship, and transfer in anticipation of deathhad been proved, the appropriate result would have been a return of
the property to Clarence Reid's estate. Plaintiff's arguments from
the statute and from the common law were inconsistent from a
86. The courts are particularly emphatic in the statements and application of the rule
(requiring a high degree of proof) where there has been delay in the assertion of
the trust against one having legal title, resulting in the difficulty in procuring witnesses and in establishing a defense, especially where the trust is based on communications or transactions with a person since deceased.
76 Am. Jur. 2d §637 at 847 (1975).
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policy point of view. The common law constructive trust favors
restitution of unjust enrichment. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-2-13 strikes a
balance between the Statute of Frauds and restitution.
In a case where facts are shown to exist which seem to call for application of both the constructive trust based on a failed oral express
trust and §46-2-13, the statutory result should be chosen. Caution,
and consistency in policy, should require the court to hold that
§46-2-13 preempts use of the common law trust when the constructive trust is used to convey land to the beneficiary of an express oral
trust other than the settlor.
CAROLYN LEVIN

